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Resources, Rent-Seeking, and Reform 
in Thailand and Myanmar (Burma)
The Economics-Politics Nexus
ABSTRACT
This article examines the economics-politics nexus in Thailand and Myanmar in the 
context of rent-seeking, revenues from oil and gas resources, and possible political 
reform. 
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INTRODUCTION
Thailand’s relatively free print media in November 2008 carried stories in-
dicative of the different stages of political development currently experienced 
by Thailand and its neighbor, Myanmar (Burma). The Irrawaddy Magazine 
that month proclaimed: “40 Burmese Dissidents Given Prison Terms of up 
to 65 years”; “Young Burmese Blogger Sentenced to More Than 20 Years in 
Jail”; “Two More Join Burma’s List of Detained Journalists.”1 By contrast, 
the Bangkok Nation, a leading Thai newspaper, announced that newly elected 
Bangkok Governor Apirak Kosayodhin had resigned because the National 
Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) had found him guilty.2 Con-
victed along with Apirak were former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, 
former Interior Minister Bhokin Bhalakula, and former Commerce Minister 
Wattana Muangsuk, in relation to a 6.6 million baht (US$220,000) fire-engine 
Helen James is Associate Professor (Adjunct) with the Australian Demographic and Social Re-
search Institute, College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National University. She wishes to 
thank the anonymous referee for helpful comments in finalizing this article for publication. Email: 
<helen.james@anu.edu.au>.
1. Irrawaddy Magazine, November 2008. The dissidents’ sentences arose from the deliberations 
of a “Special Court” convened in secret in Yangon’s Insein Prison. Myanmar needs a complete 
overhaul of its legal framework and judiciary. 
2. Bangkok Nation, November 13, 2008.
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procurement contract.3 A new election for governor was held, even though 
Apirak’s Democrat Party colleagues urged him to stay in office pending an 
appeal. 
Other headlines in the Bangkok Nation around the same time announced 
that Britain had canceled the visa of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shi-
nawatra because of his jail sentence for abuse of power arising from the 
Ratchadaphisek land fraud case, and that the Philippines would reject any 
request from Thaksin for asylum. The newspaper said Thaksin had put his 
family’s interests above the nation’s. In the meantime, pro- and anti-government 
rallies by those supporting the People’s Power Party (PPP)4 or its opponents, 
the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD),5 were spreading. This kept alive 
the political turmoil that has wracked Thailand since May 2008, when the 
new government elected in December 2007 indicated its intention to amend 
the military-drafted 2007 Constitution in order to absolve Thaksin of cor-
ruption allegations.6 
The Myanmar Times, one of the English-language outlets of the government-
controlled Myanmar media, in November 2008 had a different perspective on 
“news.” Its headlines read: “More Cooperation Needed on Food Supplies”; 
“Government Rejects Bangladesh Demands.”7 The different emphases be-
tween the media demonstrate how a free, as opposed to a controlled, press 
can focus a spotlight on government actions. The emphases also reflect the 
different stages of institutional development in the two societies. Where The 
Irrawaddy highlights the lack of an independent judiciary in the military dic-
tatorship that is Myanmar, the Bangkok Nation articulates the alleged inde-
pendence of the Thai judiciary in prosecuting a former prime minister. It also 
3. Samak Sundaravej was Bangkok’s governor when the fire engines contract was made. Apirak 
had approved a letter of credit to an Austrian firm. This violated the Government Procurement Act. 
4. The name evokes allusions to the People’s Party, which overthrew the absolute monarchy in 
1932; the reverberations of the PPP name may not assist Thaksin who was accused of seeking to 
supplant the highly revered Thai monarchy. Duncan McCargo, ed., Rethinking Thailand’s Southern 
Violence (Copenhagen: NIAS [Nordic Institute of Asian Studies] Press, 2007), explores the concept 
of a “Network Monarchy,” which Thaksin allegedly set out to destroy. 
5. The PAD is a mixture of urban intellectuals, some of whom participated in the 1992 anti-
military demonstrations; civil society groups and labor activists; and old-style Thai aristocrats op-
posed to Thaksin’s abuse of power.
6. These included a large Ex-Im bank loan to Myanmar of 4 billion baht ($103 million) for 
telecommunications equipment on the condition that it be purchased from Thaksin’s family com-
pany, Shin Corporation, and tax evasion charges relating to the sale of Shin Corporation to the 
Singapore-based Temasek Corporation.
7. Myanmar Times, November 11–16, 2008.
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points to the resilience of the reconstituted NCCC in pursuing all holders of 
public office accused of malfeasance, regardless of political affiliation.
Thai institutions have not always been so resilient. At the end of World 
War Two, the two countries, then called Burma and Siam, were at approxi-
mately equal stages of political development. Burma in its first decade of 
independence began in 1948 as a parliamentary democracy under the late 
Premier U Nu. It might have looked to a more favorable future, but the 
major institutions supporting its fledgling democracy proved fragile.8 Thai-
land, a military dictatorship since November 1947, had chased the founding 
father of its democratic development, the late Premier Pridi Panomyong, 
into ignominious exile, accused of being complicit in the 1946 regicide of the 
young King Ananda Mahidol. However, despite periods of more democratic 
forms of governance (as in Burma, 1948–58 and 1960–62, and in Thailand, 
1973–76 and 1992–2006), military dictatorships and corruption have been 
the preponderant forms of political society in both countries for much of 
their post-war history. 
One of the major criticisms of Thaksin during his terms of office (2001–
05; 2005–06) was that he undermined the institutions established by the 
“reformist” 1997 Constitution. The document had been intended to stem the 
tide of political and bureaucratic corruption and ensure greater transparency 
in government procurement procedures. In the decade before 1997, corrup-
tion and opaqueness together had resulted in leakage from the national bud-
get of over 30%, according to a member of Parliament (MP) who had served 
on the budget scrutinizing committee.9 Awareness of the importance of Thai 
institutions—the NCCC, Electoral Commission, Constitutional Court, Su-
preme Court, Ombudsman, Human Rights Commission, and National 
8. Thant Myint-U, River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (London: Faber, 2008), 
discusses the venality of the Burmese judiciary and its adverse impact on his grandfather’s, U 
Thant’s, own family. Venality and conflicts of interest resulted in an irremediable split in the ruling 
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) in 1958, setting Burma up for decades of military 
rule following Ne Win’s coup on March 2, 1962. The untrustworthiness of civilian politicians proved 
useful propaganda for Ne Win and successive military governments in Burma/Myanmar to discredit 
democratic political formations.
9. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand 
(Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, Political Economy Center, 1994), p. 151. The 1997 Constitu-
tion was discriminatory in requiring academic educational qualifications for all elected politicians, 
thus limiting the potential participation in the nation’s political life of large numbers of citizens and 
paving the way for Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party’s populist policies. The military-sponsored 
2007 Constitution features a return to a partially appointed Senate, a retrograde step in terms of 
democratic institutional development.
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Audit Committee—in sustaining the credibility of Thai democracy led to a 
concerted attempt in the 2007 Constitution to ensure that they remain ro-
bust, unable to be suborned by current or future elected politicians. An 
opinion poll conducted by Bangkok’s Assumption Business Administration 
College (ABAC) in April 2008 among Bangkok residents found that 80% of 
interviewees were prepared to let the courts decide on the corruption allega-
tions against Thaksin and other politicians. This result, in fact, showed con-
siderable faith among the Bangkok public in the Thai judicial system.10
Thailand, by the election of late 2007, had returned to a precarious form of 
contested democratic governance. Still, corruption at all levels of the adminis-
trative apparatus plagues both it and Myanmar. Thailand, in Larry Diamond’s 
terms, is a superficial democracy that exhibits an “authoritarian undertow.”11 
Myanmar has the unenviable distinction of being identified as one of the 
world’s most corrupt polities by the 2007 Transparency International Corrup-
tion Index, which accorded it a score of 1.9, just above Haiti.12 This result cor-
relates with low scores for Myanmar on the 2007/08 United Nations Develop-
ment Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (.58, just below 
Cambodia and Laos) and a medium score for Thailand (.78).13 It appears that 
extensive leakage from both national budgets derives from political and bureau-
cratic forms of corruption as well as ill-designed socioeconomic policies. These 
policies have failed to address the increasing disparity in income distribution, 
suggesting that harm is being done to the majority of both populations. 
In 1996, just one year before the Asian financial crisis and after some years 
of export-led economic growth averaging over 7% annually, Pasuk and Sung-
sidh observed: “Among middle-income countries, Thailand now ranks sixth 
worst in income distribution, surpassed only by five Latin American 
countries.”14 The richest 40% of Thais controlled 77% of the country’s 
wealth; the poorest 60% controlled only 23% of wealth. Does this correlation 
10. Medhi Krongkaew, seminar “New Dimension in Anti-corruption Movements in Thailand,” 
Australian National University, Sparke-Helmore Law Theater, April 16, 2008.
11. Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” Foreign 
Affairs 87:2 (March/April 2008), pp. 36–48.
12. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, at <www.transparencyinter-
national.org>, accessed September 4, 2008.
13. UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidar-
ity in a Divided World (Houndmills, Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 235–36. 
14. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsanan, and Nualnoi Treerat, Challenging Social Exclu-
sion: Rights and Livelihood in Thailand (Geneva: Institute for Labor Studies, 1996), p. 13, show that over 
the previous 20 years, the richest 20% of the population increased their share of the national wealth 
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suggest that despite the adoption of more democratic forms of governance 
in Thailand,15 the actual political societies of Thailand and Myanmar are 
more closely aligned than may at first be apparent, with the major share of 
the nation’s wealth concentrated in comparatively few hands? Certainly, both 
are hierarchical, authoritarian-style societies dominated by military and bu-
reaucratic elites. Throughout October and November 2008, the PAD, Thai-
land’s avowed supporters of “democracy,” issued frequent calls for the army 
to intervene and overthrow the elected government. This effort might cause 
one to question whether democratic principles have in fact been deeply in-
stilled in the well-educated, prosperous Thai urban elite. Such values might 
have been expected from a country that at first glance appears to be a prime 
example of modernization theory in practice. Indeed, increasing prosperity 
arising from industrialization and export-led growth might have been ex-
pected to create an urbanized middle class devoted to democratization. But 
such a neat equation may be too deterministic and too closely aligned to 
Western historical developments as seen through the eyes of Max Weber.16 
As Diamond argues, economic growth alone does not produce a deeply 
consolidated democracy. The legal and political institutions that control cor-
ruption, punish abuse of office, and “ensure a level economic and political 
playing field” must march in tandem with improvements in governance. 
Otherwise, citizens’ faith in this form of government will be compromised, 
producing what Diamond calls the “democratic recession.”17
RESOURCES AND RENT-SEEKING
Education and Economics
“Resources” in this discussion identifies all forms of human and natural 
endowments available to a political society in deciding what its norms of 
from 49% to 61%, while the share of the poorest 20% fell from 5% to 3% over the same period. Over 
the same period, the share of the middle 60% of the population was 36% of the national wealth.
15. Including constitutions (18 of them since 1932), multi-party elections, an “independent judi-
ciary,” a relatively free press, and a bicameral parliament elected by universal suffrage.
16. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–05; rev. 1920), translation 
and new introduction by Stephen Kalberg (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001); H. Nord-
holt and Gerry Van Klinken, eds., Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), examine the disjunction between economic growth and democracy 
in Suharto’s Indonesia.
17. Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback.”
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governance will be. The positive correlation between a society’s level of gen-
eral educational attainment and its economic development leads to the as-
sumption that Thailand must be a more robust political society, more con-
ducive to sustaining democratic forms of governance, than is Myanmar. The 
latter’s educational system since 1962 has been desiccated in proportion to 
the ideologies of successive military governments, which see nodes of inde-
pendent thought as potential sources of challenge to state authority. Myan-
mar’s parlous economic condition has never recovered from the dual assault 
on its educational institutions and its middle class launched by the late dicta-
tor, General Ne Win. Its economy remains shaky despite windfall revenues 
in recent years from oil and gas sales to Thailand, China, Malaysia, and India 
that are reputed to have yielded a trade surplus in the 2007–08 financial year 
on the order of $3 billion.18 
Myanmar.  Myanmar exemplifies the adverse correlation between revenue from 
natural resource sales and non-democratic political forms, often referred to as 
the “resource curse.” Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz note that cross-national 
studies have shown that “access to oil wealth can allow leaders to successfully 
repress or co-opt their oppositions, and thus avoid having to relinquish power 
through electoral competition.”19 A broad endowment of natural resources, 
especially oil and gas wealth, may impede the development of a country’s 
human resources, if institutional and policy underpinnings to ensure equitable 
distribution of these natural resources throughout the society are absent. Nich-
olas Shaxson has noted the prevalence of vertically integrated patronage politics 
accompanying a large endowment of natural resources, along with correlated 
conflict, social inequality, high levels of corruption, and low levels of demo-
cratic governance, in countries afflicted by the resource curse.20 Humphreys, 
18. The offshore Shwe, Yetagun, and Yadana gas fields developed by Myanmar Oil and Gas 
Enterprise in partnership with South Korean Daewoo Corporation; Malaysia’s Petronas; Japan’s 
Nippon Oil Exploration; China’s CNOOC, Ltd.; Thailand’s PTTEP; India’s Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation; and the Gas Authority of India, Ltd.; plus French, Australian, and U.S. companies are 
reported to have reserves between 8.6 and 10 trillion cubic feet. Some 1.16 billion cubic feet per day 
of gas from the Yetagun and Yadana fields are exported to Thailand, earning Myanmar in 2007 $2.7 
billion. See Irrawaddy Magazine, April 14, 2008; “Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar,” Power and 
Interest News Report (Chicago), October 8, 2007, <http://www.pinr.com>. 
19. Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz, eds., Escaping the Resource Curse 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 12.
20. Nicholas Shaxson, “Oil, Corruption, and the Resource Curse,” International Affairs 83:6 
(November 2007), pp. 1123–40.
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Sachs, and Stiglitz identify three features of predatory, resource-dependent 
states like Myanmar that reflect on their tardy and uneven embrace of demo-
cratic forms of governance: the lack of pressure to exchange political power for 
the right to tax, because revenue to run the state is readily derived from other 
sources; the capacity to invest in coercive technologies that can be used to sup-
press challenges to rulers’ political power; and the diminished opportunities for 
citizens to experience the transformative effects elsewhere of industrialization 
associated with movements toward democratization.21
Not only is Myanmar’s sociopolitical development constrained by the op-
eration of these convergent issues, but it is also clear that economic develop-
ment alone, as measured by trade surpluses, is inadequate to initiate a sus-
tained embrace of democratic forms of governance. Despite Myanmar’s 
revenues from its oil and gas sales, its “democratic deficit”22 is only too ap-
parent, with low levels of citizen participation in public life, poor representa-
tion of their interests, and widespread abuse of power by the autocratic state.
Although it has been increasing its national revenues from the industrial 
sector, Myanmar remains an agrarian state. Around 70% of its population of 
55.6 million lives in rural areas and about 64% of the labor force works in the 
agricultural sector. Prior to the increase in national revenue derived from the 
gas and oil sales, the agricultural sector accounted for around 50% of total 
foreign-export earnings.23 However, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
2008 revised this downward to 43%, in addition to industry, now providing 
around 20%, and gas and oil some 37%.24 Despite achieving modest rates of 
growth in recent years based on gas and oil revenues, and some market-
oriented reforms in the agriculture and finance sectors,25 poverty remains 
the overwhelming life experience for most people, as they seek to cope with 
double-digit inflation. Economic hardship, with sudden increases in the 
price of gasoline and bus fares, was the spark that lit the September 2007 
anti-government demonstrations. Economic issues caused by sudden de-
monetization set off the civil unrest that led to the pro-democracy uprising 
21. Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, eds., Escaping the Resource Curse, p. 13.
22. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13:1 (January 
2002), pp. 5–21, suggests the aid community integrate programs of socioeconomic development 
with democracy-building. 
23. By comparison, in 1993, the Thai agricultural sector accounted for 56% of the labor force, 
but contributed only 12% of gross domestic product (GDP). See Pasuk et al., Challenging Social 
Exclusion, p. 12.
24. ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2008 (Manila: ADB, 2008), p. 213.
25. Myanmar officially repudiated its socialist-style economy in 1988. 
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in 1988. Economic vulnerability and political instability go hand in hand in 
Myanmar.
Despite the expansion of Myanmar’s network of universities to encom-
pass 155 tertiary institutions and some attempts to improve the human re-
sources available to support them, the quality of education in Myanmar is 
still lacking. To assist in addressing this issue, Japan, Germany, Malaysia, 
Thailand, China, India, and South Korea in recent years have made some 
scholarships available to upgrade teacher qualifications and encourage 
young Burmese to undertake graduate studies in their respective countries. 
One positive development has been the expansion of the Internet and its 
application to educational programs, despite ongoing political censorship. 
Internet technology was used to devastating effect during the so-called Saf-
fron Revolution in September 2007, when images of the violent suppres-
sion of the demonstrations were uploaded via mobile phone cameras to the 
outside world.
The state’s response was swift, as the headlines in The Irrawaddy, above, 
show. Activist networks continue to defy the authorities, accessing proxy 
sites in order to seek information from the international community. With-
out an enabling political environment in which human “capabilities”26 can 
be exerted to their fullest extent, the education and skills that students re-
ceive cannot be applied to the greatest capacity, a factor limiting Myanmar’s 
economic development.27
Despite the country’s high adult literacy rate (“adult” refers to those over 
15 years of age), estimated by the World Bank in 2006,28 the ADB in 2008, 
and the Myanmar Ministry of Education in 2002,29 respectively, to be 
around 92%, somewhere between 26.6% and 50% of the rural population 
lives below the U.N.-designated poverty line of US$1 per day.30 The World 
Health Organization (WHO) in 2005 estimated that 30% of children under 
five years of age were malnourished (compared to the Australian Agency for 
26. As explicated by Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999).
27. Helen James, Governance and Civil Society in Myanmar: Education, Health, and Environment 
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), analyzes the development of the education sector.
28. World Bank, Labor Migration in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (Bangkok: Synthesis Report 
Phase I, World Bank, 2006).
29. Myanmar Ministry of Education, Enhancing Accessibility to Education in Myanmar (Yangon: 
Ministry of Education, 2002).
30. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
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International Development’s 2002 estimate of 46%).31 At the same time, the 
WHO estimated the per capita gross national income (purchasing power 
parity) to be less than $875. Despite the income from oil and gas revenues, 
therefore, the average annual income for the ordinary person appears to be 
declining; in 2001, the UNDP estimated it had reached $1,000.32 As Bur-
mese workers return from Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as a result of 
the global financial crisis, unemployment may exacerbate this situation.33 
The apparently high literacy rate is at odds with a high basic education attri-
tion rate: somewhere around 50% of school-age children drop out between 
middle school and high school, particularly in rural areas, as a result of pov-
erty and the need to assist their families in agricultural work.34 
For 40 years beginning in 1948, when government control outside the major 
towns was precarious, a significant portion of Myanmar’s resources was con-
sumed in a civil war. This situation started to change in 1989 when cease-fires 
were negotiated with 16 of the insurgent groups. Although the country’s for-
eign currency reserves have improved considerably since 2001 (when they were 
estimated at $300 million)35 and gross national income has increased as a result 
of gas and oil sales, only a very small percentage of revenue finds its way into 
social-sector improvement policies. In 2003, the national health budget was set 
at 2.8% of GDP; nevertheless, this was an increase from 0.8% in 2001.36 The 
health budget has been slowly increasing, from eight billion kyats ($8 million) 
in 2001 to 23.4 billion kyats ($23.4 million) in 2007.37 
Bearing in mind that this represents only 17% of total expenditure on 
health, and that the private sector accounts for around 73%, the government 
health budget suffers severe constraints. The Myanmar Ministry of Health 
estimated that per capita expenditure from all sources—private, governmental, 
31. Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Budget Papers 2002, Canberra, 
at <http://www.ausaid.gov.au>, accessed June 15, 2002.
32. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Develop-
ment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 143. 
33. Irrawaddy Magazine, November 21, 2008. However, any expectations of the regime’s demise 
on economic grounds are probably premature. 
34. See James, Governance and Civil Society in Myanmar. Data are drawn from the Myanmar 
Ministry of Education, Enhancing Accessibility. 
35. Sean Turrell estimates Myanmar’s foreign exchange reserves at $4 billion. See Irrawaddy 
Magazine, August 22, 2008.
36. This can be compared with 8.2% of GDP for defense (World Bank, World Development 
Report 2000/2001). 
37. Myanmar Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar (Yangon: Ministry of Health, 2007).
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and international—was less than 500 kyats in 2007. What does this equate 
to? If computed at the official rate of six kyats to the dollar, we have an an-
nual expenditure of around $83 per person. However, if computed at the 
market rate of 1,020 kyats per dollar, the per capita expenditure from all 
sources is less than $0.50 per year. In a country suffering from such virulent 
diseases as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, and where leprosy is still 
found in 27 villages, it is easy to envisage a health sector under severe stress. 
In 2000, the WHO rated Myanmar 191st out of 192 countries in terms of the 
quality of health care provided to its population. If health care, as Ahlburg 
and Flint have argued, is a robust measure of development and the effective-
ness of state governance, these figures reveal how ineffective the policies are 
that retard Myanmar’s socioeconomic and political development.38 The 
WHO in 2005 recorded these statistics for Myanmar’s population (see Fig-
ures 1 and 2).
Thailand.  At first glance, Thailand, a country without significant naturally oc-
curring oil and gas reserves, appears not to conform to the theoretical construct 
of the resource curse. Over the past several decades, it developed sufficiently 
viable forms of democratic governance to generate waves of citizen protest 
when those norms were deviated from during the 2006 military coup. It is 
irrefutable that Thailand has developed a sizable well-educated, prosperous 
middle class and significant civil society. By contrast with Myanmar, Thailand 
has invested in its education sector and promoted industrialization, although, 
38. Dennis Ahlburg and D. Flint, “Public Health Conditions and Policies in the Asia Pacific 
Region,” Journal of Asian Pacific Economic Literature 15:2 (May 2001), pp. 1–17. In January 2000, I 
visited some of the 17 feeding centers for children at risk established by the Myanmar Maternal and 
Child Welfare Association. 
figure 1. Maternal and Child Mortality Statistics for Myanmar
Mortality
Life Expectancy at Birth (2003 Data) Males, 56 years; Females, 63 years 
Under five years per 1,000 live births (2003 data) 106
Neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births (2000 data)  40
Maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (2000 data) 360
source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2005 (Geneva: WHO, 2005).
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as Pasuk et al. point out,39 this is capital-intensive with a high degree of foreign 
direct investment. Successive Thai governments sought to keep labor costs low 
and obstruct the growth of the trade union movement. As a consequence, 
Pasuk et al. argue, rural labor has not been absorbed into wage employment in 
the industrial sector as happened in South Korea in 1960–80. During eco-
nomic downturns, the seasonal migratory Thai labor force returns to its rural 
origins. The rural masses thus remain fairly traditional, closely aligned to the 
former military and business parties, rather than to the Bangkok-based civil 
society networks whose urbanized elite are vociferous in promoting democratic 
forms of governance. However, as Suchit Bunbongkarn cautions, “Even the 
urban middle class, which supported the pro-democracy groups during the 
May 1992 event [author: and the PAD in 2006–08], does not agree with radi-
cal political reform.”40 
It was the rural masses in Thailand who delivered three election victories 
(2001, 2005, and 2006) to Thaksin Shinawatra’s now defunct TRT and its 
successor, the PPP (now also disbanded by order of the Constitutional 
Court) in 2007. Thus, the election victories are not necessarily an indication 
39. Pasuk, Sungsidh, and Nualnoi, Challenging Social Exclusion, p. 12.
40. Suchit Bunbongkarn, “The Military and Democracy in Thailand,” in The Military and De-
mocracy in Asia and the Pacific, eds. R. May and V. Selochan (Bathurst, New South Wales, Australia: 
Crawford Publishing, Ltd., 1998), p. 58. In May 1992, pro-democracy groups led by former General 
(and now PAD democracy activist) Chamlong Srimuang led demonstrations in Bangkok against the 
assumption of power by military strongman General Suchinda Krapayoon. Suchinda, in a humiliat-
ing audience with King Bumibhol Adulyadej, was forced to step down in the wake of military-led 
violence against citizen and student demonstrators.
figure 2. Morbidity Statistics for Myanmar
Morbidity
Adult rate living with HIV (2003 data) 1.2%
Adults (15–49 years) and children living with HIV (2003 data) 330,000
No. of polio cases (2004 data)  0
TB—new smear cases per 100,000 (2003 data) 76
Low birth weight newborns (2000–02 data) 15%
Children under five years stunted for age (2003 data) 32%
Children under five years underweight for age (2003 data) 32% 
source: Ibid. to Figure 1.
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of deeply apprehended and distilled democratic principles arising from the 
transformation of Thai civil society. Rather, they may be an indication of a 
pragmatic rural electorate making “rational choices” in casting their votes for 
policies and parties that most immediately benefit their own interests.41 Prior 
to the 2001 election that brought Thaksin to office, as McCargo and Path-
manand state: 
There was public unease about the symbiotic relationship between business 
people (including the rising provincial business class) and politicians, which 
often ensured that constituency MPs were little more than the stooges of local 
and national business elites. Political parties were much-criticized as factional-
ized alliances of interest groups, divorced from the concerns of the electorate. 
Practices such as candidate-buying (encouraging electable politicians to switch 
parties by using financial inducements), vote-buying, and the corruption of 
government officials made the electoral process wide open to manipulation 
and abuse.42
Their views concur with those of Pasuk and Sungsidh, who found that peo-
ple with little education and low incomes such as slum dwellers, manual 
workers, and farmers regarded politicians as more corrupt than bureaucrats. 
Conversely, those with higher education and income levels, such as people 
in the professions or media, non-governmental organization (NGO) work-
ers, and academics, considered bureaucrats more corrupt than politicians.43 
Although corruption in Thailand, as Pasuk and Sungsidh have shown, is 
ingrained in the cultural practices and patron-client networks, the scale of 
bureaucratic and political corruption appears to have increased in line with 
the country’s economic development. Annual reports of the Counter Cor-
ruption Commission (the predecessor of the NCCC), which investigated 
only cases brought to its attention by individuals or government depart-
ments, showed an increase in misused funds arising from bureaucratic cor-
ruption from 317.9 million baht ($13 million) in 1986 to 1.26 billion baht 
($50 million) in 1992. In these years, Thailand’s export-led economy was 
rapidly expanding. 
41. Thaksin’s populist policies, subsidized health care, and micro-credit schemes contributed to 
his support base among the rural masses.
42. Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: 
NIAS Press, 2005), p. 11.
43. Pasuk and Sungsidh, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand, p. 169.
AS5002_08_James.indd   437 4/29/10   5:25 PM
438  • ASIAN SURvEY 50:2
By comparison, the reports of the Office of the Auditor-General, which 
checks government department accounts, showed an increase in corruption 
funds between 1987 and 1990 from 108.7 million baht ($4.3 million) to 175.5 
million baht ($7 million).44 The increasing national wealth of Thailand, be-
cause it is so unevenly distributed, has bolstered opportunities for corruption 
in both the bureaucratic and political spheres. To combat this situation, 
Pasuk and Sungsidh suggest that the living standards of most people need to 
be raised and income inequality reduced [and] “then corruption among cer-
tain groups of people can be expected to decline.”45 The analysts look to 
improving the education system, raising people’s consciousness of the re-
sponsibilities inhering to holders of public office, and improving enforce-
ment mechanisms to make the cost of corruption much higher. Thailand 
demonstrates Thomas Carothers’s “feckless pluralism,” where democracy 
is perceived as shallow and political elites from all parties are seen as self-
interested and ineffective, “unable to make headway on most” major 
problems.46
The Resilience of Institutions
The above three conditions—improving the education system, raising 
people’s consciousness about the responsibilities inhering to holders of 
public office, and improving enforcement mechanisms to boost the cost of 
corruption—coalesced in the PAD’s opposition to Thaksin and the elected 
government (which the PAD considered to be his surrogates).47 The better 
educated, more prosperous urbanized Bangkok elite who supported the PAD 
called a halt to the overt exploitation of office that enabled Thaksin to amass 
76.5 billion baht ($3.6 billion) in just over three years. Exercising the respon-
sibilities of public office, Thai institutions—the NCCC and the Supreme 
Court—sentenced Thaksin to a jail term of two years. Other prosecutions 
delivered more-severe sentences. On November 14, 2008, the NCCC found 
former Interior Minister Sombat Uthairang guilty of concealing assets 
44. Corruption investigated by the NCCC refers to funds derived from bribes offered to public 
officials; corruption investigated by the Office of the Auditor-General refers to funds derived from 
the national budget allocations that have been misappropriated by officials.
45. Pasuk and Sungsidh, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand, p. 168.
46. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” pp. 10–11.
47. Chu Yun-han, “Third-Wave Democratization in East Asia: Challenges and Prospect,” Asien 
100 (July 2006), pp. 11–17, <http://www.asienkunde.de/articles/A100_011_017.pdf>, argues that sig-
nificant numbers in Asia’s emerging democracies harbor an attachment to authoritarianism. 
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totaling over 111.5 million baht ($37 million).48 These are positive signs for 
Thai democracy; in an earlier era, public institutions were considerably more 
cautious in prosecuting prime ministers or senior government ministers and 
bureaucrats for corruption. 
Increasing awareness of the concepts of “public interest” and “public of-
fice” have made Thailand’s urbanized middle class less tolerant of bribery, 
extortion, and “gift-giving” and more determined to strengthen the machin-
ery to eliminate all types of corruption. Pasuk and Sungsidh point out that 
not only the middle class but also many “lower-echelon groups are growing 
increasingly aware that they are the ones who bear the cost of such systems 
of corruption. These two lobbies argue that the benefits in terms of economic 
growth are far outweighed by the social costs in terms of wasted resources, 
distorted distribution, environmental damage, and social inequity.”49 
The resilience of Thai institutions was severely tested in the 2006–09 con-
troversy. As Thailand’s media in November 2008 broadcast news of Thaksin’s 
intention to return to politics, former Premier (1992–95, 1997–2000) and 
adviser to the Democrat Party Chuan Leekpai asserted that Thaksin’s prob-
lem was that he could no longer control the judiciary and other government 
institutions. Although Thaksin, as a Thai citizen, could return to contest the 
legal cases against him in the courts as any other citizen could, he could no 
longer “interfere with the work of the courts or public prosecutors,” Chuan 
said.50 It is therefore a little disingenuous of Thitinan Pongsudhirak to claim 
that these major institutions for dealing with political and bureaucratic cor-
ruption in Thailand are “being steered mostly by figures who supported or 
were associated with the 2006 coup.” Their political views would seem to be 
irrelevant as long as they are doing their duty in upholding the anti-corruption 
laws. Thitinan acknowledges as much in his statement that “their mission is 
to stop graft and abuses of power.”51 
As a close partner in the Cold War-era containment of communism, Thai-
land was the beneficiary of considerable educational assistance from Western 
countries. In the past 30 years, this investment appears to have borne fruit, 
with the embedding of a class of Western-educated Thai intellectuals who 
48. Bangkok Nation, November 14, 2008.
49. Pasuk and Sungsidh, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand, p. 174.
50. The Nation (Bangkok), November 19, 2008. 
51. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy 19:4 (October 
2008), pp. 140–53.
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have found their way into the nation’s leading administrative and educational 
institutions. Since 1973 they have carried the torch of political development, 
ousting a series of military dictators and fostering continued evolution toward 
a more open society and participatory politics. The “demi-democracy,” as 
Likhit Dhiravegin styled Thai politics in 1992,52 may not yet have become a 
full participatory democracy. But the prolonged confrontation between the 
PPP and the PAD for control of the nation’s policy-making apparatus would 
not have been possible without the educational awakening and broadening 
of the political consciousness of the electorate over the past few decades. 
Pasuk and Sungsidh give a snapshot of comparative educational access at the 
time of the election of the Chatichai Choonhavan government (in office 
1988–91): 
In 1988, professional and business households accounted for 13 per cent of the 
population and their children accounted for 55 per cent of all enrolments both 
in upper secondary and university level. Labouring households represented 20 
per cent of all population, but their children accounted for 35 per cent of total 
enrolments at upper secondary and 24 per cent at university level. But for 
farming households, which represented 67 per cent of the total population, 
their children accounted for only 20 per cent and 11 per cent of all enrolments 
at upper secondary and university level.53
It is this type of disproportionate representation in the nation’s educational 
institutions and economic life that Thai administrations need to address, if 
they are to make inroads into the sources of corruption and attempt to come 
to grips with the considerable social divisions presently wracking their society. 
A measure of how far consciousness of the importance of participation in po-
litical life has permeated all sectors of Thai society may be judged from the 
public outrage at the PAD’s self-serving suggestion that 70% of the representa-
tives to the National Assembly should be appointed (although it was not 
stated, the implication was that it would be by the king) and only 30% elected. 
This nexus between the overall level of educational attainment, economic de-
velopment, and democratic, pluralistic party politics was captured by Seymour 
52. Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi-Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System (Singapore: 
Times Academic Press, 1992).
53. Pasuk, Sungsidh, and Nualnoi, Challenging Social Exclusion, p. 17. Pasuk’s statistics are from 
the World Bank, Thailand Poverty and Income Distribution Trends, Country Department I, East Asia 
and Pacific Region, Report no. 11982-TH, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1993, p. 46.
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Lipset: “The more economically developed and literate a country is, the more 
likely it is to have a competitive party system.”54 
Education is the vial through which the purported link between democ-
racy and economic development is distilled, but there is not necessarily a 
direct linear development. Still, Carothers asserts that “the wealthier a country 
is, the better will be its chances of consolidating a democratic transition.”55 
Thai academic Somchai Phatharathananunth argues that more economic 
development does not necessarily produce a middle class that naturally (s)elects 
non-corrupt politicians or is devoted to pluralistic multi-party politics. Eco-
nomic development and correlated educational development in some coun-
tries have produced a corporate class closely aligned with one-party politics. 
Somchai asserts: 
Even though there is a positive correlation between development and democ-
racy, other factors such as social and political structure also influence the 
course of democratic development. As a result, social change does not occur 
in a unilinear manner. Development can also generate new forms of patron-
client relations and encourage corruption. Moreover, it is the very same mid-
dle classes who have emerged from the modernization process that engender 
and often benefit from corruption. . . . For example, more modernization in 
the provinces, both in villages and towns, generated higher levels of corrup-
tion. It must be noted that the middle classes in such areas . . . do not dem-
onstrate a voting behaviour different from that of farmers; they also vote for 
corrupt politicians.56
Somchai’s views concur with those of Pasuk and Sungsidh that political contests 
in Thailand are played out for control of the corruption revenue, rather than for 
any major ideological differences.57 Politicians spend vast sums, anticipating 
that they will recoup the investment through the patronage and business net-
works that put them in office. Thitinan’s observation that the 2007 Constitu-
tion strengthens the judiciary at the expense of the executive and legislative 
54. Seymour M. Lipset, “Political Sociology,” in Neil J. Smelser, Sociology: An Introduction, ed. 
Neil J. Smelser (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 449.
55. Thomas Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy 18:1 (January 2007), 
p. 24.
56. Somchai Phatharathananunth, “Civil Society and Democratization in Thailand: A Critique 
of Elite Democracy,” in Reforming Thai Politics, ed. Duncan McCargo (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2002), 
pp. 125–42. 
57. Pasuk and Sungsidh, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand, p. 19.
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branches is apposite;58 the PAD may have morphed into a pro-establishment/
pro-monarchist movement, but there is no denying the determination of the 
anti-Thaksin forces to curb corruption and malfeasance in public office.
Thai institutions that address the problem of endemic corruption are con-
siderably more robust than those in neighboring Myanmar, whose judges 
involved in the 2008–09 trials of democracy activists have been accused of 
condoning and participating in human rights abuses. Not that corruption is 
not addressed from time to time in Myanmar, but the processes by which it 
is addressed are much less transparent, as could be expected in a military 
dictatorship. Thus, the government controlled media will suddenly an-
nounce the “retirement” of senior military figures or bureaucrats, with cor-
ruption sometimes overtly identified as the reason for their dismissal. Still, 
one can never be sure that this was the real reason, or whether corruption 
was a useful shorthand in removing figures whom it is no longer convenient 
to maintain close to the seat of power.59
Most frequently in Myanmar, prosecutions are undertaken not to punish 
corruption but for challenging the state power apparatus. Lack of transparency 
goes in tandem with less than robust sociopolitical institutions charged with 
tackling corruption, as well as a less than independent judiciary to support 
them. Sections of the middle class, intellectuals, and students reject this state of 
affairs but are silenced, or unable to take remedial action to move their country 
toward more-participatory politics. In interviews with 120 people on whether 
they would participate in an anti-government activist network, Kyaw Yin Hla-
ing records that all declined: they preferred to protect their personal safety.60
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
Resources and Reform
What are the prospects for sociopolitical reform in Myanmar and Thailand? 
In both countries, the opposing sides appear reluctant to negotiate a settlement 
58. Thitinan, “Thailand since the Coup,” p. 144. 
59. One version of the removal of the former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt states that Senior 
General Than Shwe ordered Khin Nyunt to punish his officers at Lashio for corruption; however, 
Khin Nyunt responded that he could only do that if Than Shwe first punished his corrupt followers. 
Khin Nyunt was charged with treason and only just escaped a death penalty. 
60. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The State of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian Myanmar/
Burma,” in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, ed. Xiaolin Guo (Stockholm: Institute for 
Security and Development Policy, 2008), p. 84. 
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of their differences. Both countries are divided societies facing the prospect 
of periods of sustained civil unrest. In Thailand, in April 2009, Thaksin’s Red 
Shirt supporters forced the cancellation of the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) summit amid their efforts to oust the unelected 
government of Abhisit Vejjajiva. These actions paralleled those of their Yel-
low Shirt opponents in 2008. The attempted assassination of PAD leader 
Sondhi Limthongkul on April 17, 2009, heralded further civil unrest, such 
as transpired on March 13, 2010, following the February 26 judgment of the 
Supreme Court confirming the confiscation of around 50% of Thaksin’s 
fortune.
International sanctions against Myanmar since 1988 assume that econom-
ics holds the key to resolving the impasse that has allowed the military gov-
ernment to stay in office despite losing the 1990 elections.61 Those who im-
pose and support sanctions assume that barriers to trade and investment will 
spur an economic collapse, following which a fully fledged democratic gov-
ernment will emerge. They assume that sanctions cause economic hardship 
for the majority of the population, which will result in a spontaneous and 
successful uprising. The leaders are insulated from this hardship through 
their control of the corruption revenue. Since 1988, much of the interna-
tional community outside of ASEAN, China, India, Japan, and South Korea 
have adopted sanctions as their primary means to prompt sociopolitical 
change in Myanmar.
Such an approach seems to run counter to the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) own research that more-open trade policies help ameliorate the 
sociopolitical effects of the resource curse62 in resource abundant countries. 
This one-dimensional sanctions policy inadequately takes account of a range 
of issues applying to Myanmar that enable the government to stay in power. 
Myanmar’s geopolitical relationships, its comparative de-linking from the 
global international trade regime—precisely because of the sanctions—its firm 
support in the Security Council by China and Russia, and its resource-rich 
61. Won by the National League for Democracy (NLD) with 59.87% of valid votes cast, the 
purpose of these elections remains disputed. Aung San Suu Kyi, in her Freedom from Fear and Other 
Writings (New York: Penguin, 1996), ch. 17, and in “Interview with Dominic Faulder,”Asiaweek, July 
1989, acknowledges they were for a Constituent Assembly. Derek Tonkin states: “It would be correct 
to say that the NLD was prevented from forming a government.” See H. James, Security and Sus-
tainable Development in Myanmar (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2006), pp. 203–04.
62. Rabah Arezki and Frederick van der Ploeg, “Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned into 
a Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions,” IMF Working Paper, WP/07/55 (2007), p. 21.
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agricultural subsistence economy enable it to be relatively insulated from the 
intended consequences of the sanctions.63 
Until the global financial crisis of 2008–09, Myanmar enjoyed robust 
trading relationships with its neighbors, China, Thailand, India, Singapore, 
and Malaysia.64 As long as these trading relationships are sustained, interna-
tional sanctions applied to Myanmar are likely to remain ineffective in bring-
ing about political reform. Moreover, they have proven to be a useful tool for 
the government in seeking to deflect attention from its own policy short-
comings. The sanctions cause anger, in certain quarters, toward the NLD 
secretary-general, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Kyaw Yin Hlaing 
goes so far as to assert that if Daw Suu Kyi in 2003, as part of confidence-
building discussions between the junta and the NLD, had agreed to the 
lifting of sanctions, the violent Depayin incident “might not have taken 
place.”65 However, Kyaw is overly optimistic when he states: “If Western 
sanctions persist for a long time, the government might go bankrupt, espe-
cially when the country runs out of its natural resources.”66 The trillions of 
cubic feet of gas in the A1 and C1 blocks off the Rakhine Coast and the M3–
M9 blocks off the Gulf of Martaban being sold to China and Thailand on 
the basis of 30-year contracts leave little hope that Kyaw’s scenario might 
become a reality in the near future. Although Myanmar will undoubtedly 
experience adverse trading conditions for its agricultural exports owing to 
the current global financial crisis, this situation is unlikely to bring about the 
political implosion sought by Burmese expatriate groups. 
If sanctions are ineffective in achieving political reform and economic col-
lapse is unlikely, is revolution a possibility? The demonstrations in Septem-
ber 2007 that stemmed from widespread economic hardship were quickly 
and violently suppressed, as on previous occasions. Given the asymmetric 
power relationships between the military (over 500,000 strong) and the 
masses, a successful uprising would seem improbable. Some activists look to 
63. See James, Security and Sustainable Development, ch. 5, for a detailed account of the sanctions 
policy. 
64. ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2008. 
65. Kyaw, “The State of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian Myanmar/Burma,” 
p. 101, suggests that divisions in the opposition groups enable the government to avoid entering into 
meaningful negotiations. In 2003, at Depayin in upper Myanmar, Daw Suu Kyi’s cavalcade was 
attacked by government supporters belonging to the Union Solidarity and Development Associa-
tion; numbers of people were killed. 
66. Ibid., p. 80.
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a split in the military, citing the cases of a few middle level officers who de-
serted and went to Thailand in 2007 rather than shoot at the monks. But a 
few middle level officers do not constitute a split in the 500,000-strong mili-
tary, which holds dear the history of the Burmese independence army and 
looks on the military as the one robust, enduring national institution.67 
In a speech on March 27, 2009, Armed Forces Day, ironically reminiscent 
of what Carothers calls the “Sequencing Fallacy,”68 Myanmar’s dictator, Se-
nior General Than Shwe, stated: “Democracy in Myanmar today is at a 
fledgling stage and still requires patient care and attention. . . . Understand-
ing the process of gradual maturity is crucial.”69 Despite the use of “gradual,” 
the senior general clearly is working within the autocracy paradigm and is 
not aligned with Carothers’s preferred path of “gradualism” wherein state 
institutional capacity is strengthened before implementation of the full elec-
toral process. Carothers’s call for a non-democratic country’s “underlying 
economic, social, and political conditions, structures, and historical legacies”70 
to be taken into account by the democracy-promotion community high-
lights the inherent difficulties for a rentier state such as Myanmar to initiate 
a democratic transition.71
If political reform eventually comes to Myanmar, it will not be a result of 
economics, sanctions, or revolution (or invasion, an unlikely scenario given 
the geopolitical realities). It will come from within, as in South Africa, from 
the processes now set in train, however incomplete and imperfect they may 
be.72 Widespread international criticism of both the new Constitution com-
pleted in 2007 and the national referendum seeking approval of the Consti-
tution in May 2008 hailed the unsatisfactory nature of both. The Constitu-
tion gives the military continued control of Myanmar’s political life through 
appointment to the National Assembly. The referendum was held in spite of 
the devastation of Cyclone Nargis. Others consider that these are the only 
processes open to the citizens of Myanmar, so why not try them, to see if a 
67. Personal communication with senior military officers, Yangon, 2004. See also Mary Calla-
han, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2003).
68. Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy,” pp. 12–13. 
69. Delivered in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2009.
70. Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy,” p. 23.
71. An exception to the “resource curse,” Norway proves that a robust democracy and natural 
resource wealth are not incompatible. 
72. Hopeful signs of a change in U.S. policy toward Myanmar under the Obama administration 
may assist the “gradual” approach to democratic transition. 
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better form of governance might eventuate after elections now set for Fall 
2010. Such processes are, after all, the processes by which Thailand has 
evolved to the point where a robust urban-elite-based civil society is able to 
challenge an incumbent government over the quality of its governance.
In comparing the two countries, we should after all apply the same rules 
to both. This would mean supporting the development of Myanmar’s socio-
economic fabric in the same way the international community did in Thai-
land beginning in 1960. For Myanmar, there could be considerable interna-
tional assistance for educational development and humanitarian assistance 
for vulnerable groups, continuation of the support provided in the wake of 
Cyclone Nargis, promotion of open trade policies, and lifting of the sanc-
tions. A vigorous middle class might then develop, through which a more 
active civil society might eventuate.73 At present, judged on the basis of sala-
ries, few of Myanmar’s educated sector would qualify as middle class and 
only a small proportion of its business-entrepreneurial groups would fall into 
this bracket. Seasoned Burma/Myanmar watchers, however, do not expect 
any real change to arise from the present processes. If politics is the art of the 
possible, until recently no side in the Myanmar political equation has been 
prepared to compromise: not the NLD, nor the government, nor the inter-
national community. In the absence of an effective domestic opposition, the 
government is likely to steamroll ahead with plans for military-controlled 
elections in 2010, without any near-term possibility of multi-party politics 
emerging.
Does Civil Society Have a Role in Reform Politics?
As both Thailand and Myanmar confront how to come to terms with the 
schisms in their societies, it seems that one major difference is the respective 
level of development of their civil societies. Graeme Gill is surely correct74 in 
drawing attention to the crucial role a vibrant civil society plays not only in 
the transition process but also in sustaining and embedding democratic 
73. I am not suggesting that the presence of a vigorous middle class is a prerequisite to demo-
cratic change, but that the influence, resources, and leadership potential of such a group can assist 
in brokering and sustaining the change. Nepal is a case in point. See Subbhagya Shah, Civil Society 
in Uncivil Places: Soft State and Regime Change in Nepal (Honolulu: East-West Center, Policy Stud-
ies, no. 48, 2008).
74. Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society, and the Transition Process 
(London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 2000).
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principles once the transition has occurred. In response to the lobbying of 
activist civil society groups, Thailand established a Human Rights Commis-
sion (HRC), a development that seems a long way off in Myanmar, although 
it is debatable how robust the HRC is, in view of the continuing violence in 
Thailand. In Myanmar, although its civil society sector is growing (and was 
never completely eliminated even during Ne Win’s regime),75 most of the 
hundreds of NGOs now operating are not political advocacy networks but 
grassroots organizations devoted to caring for the needy. As long as they do 
not get involved in political movements, the government tolerates them. 
However, politically active civil society groups such as the 88 Generation 
Students are prosecuted. The problem in bringing about political reform in 
Myanmar does not arise from any lack of grassroots organizations, nor the 
weakness of the economy and the education system. The problem lies in the 
lack of a coherent, unified opposition sufficiently strong to offer alternative 
leadership. Clearly, people in Myanmar want change and reform just as ar-
dently as do the Thais. The International Crisis Group reported that people 
in Myanmar have been extremely hostile to the government since the Sep-
tember 2007 violent suppression of demonstrators, and that government 
action to disrupt the activist networks has been more extensive than previ-
ously.76 The licit space for political protest in Myanmar is now negligible. At 
present, there seems to be little chance of Myanmar developing the resilient 
public institutions that might help it escape the resource curse. 
Thai institutions are more robust in being able to sustain the movement 
toward participatory politics. Despite some missteps and the uneven disper-
sal of income, Thailand over the past 40 years has benefited from the emer-
gence of a group of intellectuals, social and political scientists, and human 
rights activists who constantly urge their country toward more open politics 
and better forms of governance. The licit space for political protest in Thai-
land has widened over the past 15 years, although an observer might wonder 
if this tolerance is not unevenly applied. There is greater tolerance of protests 
by such groups as the PAD that support the establishment, and less tolerance 
for those such as the Forum of the Poor, which do not. Aware of the dangers 
75. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Associational Life in Myanmar: Past and Present,” in Myanmar State, 
Society, and Ethnicity, eds. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Insti-
tute, 2007).
76. International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report, no. 144 
(2008), pp. 3–5.
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for Thailand if its divided society is not healed, Naruemon Thabchumpon 
calls for the rural masses to be as empowered as the urban elite. “To promote 
genuine participatory democracy,” she writes,
Thai NGOs have proposed the empowerment of the people. In their view, a 
formal democratic political system is more concerned with representation and 
political institutions such as political parties, elections and legislatures, than 
with citizen participation. . . . [E]lections are meaningless unless people are 
aware of the real choices and the meaning of those choices, as well as having 
full information concerning policies that will affect them. . . . Therefore, prog-
ress towards democracy means strengthening civil society organizations . . . 
effective control of the public agenda, and just distribution of resources.77
Correlative with empowerment of the rural poor is the embedding of the 
notion in the urban elite that the rural poor have an equal right for their 
voices to be heard in the nation’s democratic institutions. Political reform in 
Thailand and the deepening of its democracy will be contingent on resolu-
tion of these two competing issues. The Thai conflict has become a statement 
about the enduring schisms in Thai society and the determination of the 
privileged elite to retain their preeminent status. Globalization may have 
produced greater economic prosperity for the few in Thai society, and a 
grassroots civil society may confront the well-educated urban-elite civil soci-
ety. But power sharing, more-equitable distribution of resources, and deeply 
instilled democratic principles are all embryonic. Despite lacking the gas and 
oil resources of Myanmar, and being further along with democratic transi-
tion, Thailand’s fragile democracy has more in common with its neighbor 
than is usually assumed. 
77. Naruemon Thabchumpon, “NGOs and Grassroots Participation in the Political Reform 
Process,” in McCargo, ed., Reforming Thai Politics, p. 183.
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